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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 742 of 742 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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8 of 742 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Vietnamsince 2020operating below its peakbears on Public-private collaboration

North-South eastern expressway BOT sections, and the retreat to public investment

Vietnam built three component projects of the 2017-2020 North-South eastern expressway phase, 178 km at about VND 25,343 billion, as BOT public-private partnerships, then financed all ten 2021-2025 component projects on the Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City stretch as public investment, and in June 2025 the Ministry of Construction reported that it had asked the Prime Minister to keep widening the corridor with public investment money, leaving PPP as a later option once tolls were collected.

0 of 10 component projects (all public investment), 2021-2025 phase component projects on the hanoi to ho chi minh city stretch procured as ppp, 2025-06. 3 component projects (178 km, about VND 25,343 billion), 2017-2020 phase component projects built as bot, the peak, 2017-2020 phase. Government of Viet Nam portal (baochinhphu.vn), report of the Ministry of Construction's study on widening the North-South eastern expressway, 25 June 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry split the corridor into component projects and offered some of them to BOT investors, with state capital covering more than half of each project's cost and tolls repaying the private share. For the next phase the National Assembly financed every section from the budget, with the state to recover its outlay through tolls, which took private investors out of the corridor.

Preconditions

  • A ministry able to package a long corridor into sections a domestic investor can finance
  • State capital support large enough to make toll revenue cover the private share
  • A budget and a legislature willing to finance the corridor directly when investors do not close, which is also what ended the partnership route

Where else it has been used: Viability-gap BOT on a national trunk road shows how far a state will go before it simply pays for the road itself: here, once public money was available and the schedule was political, the partnership share went to zero.

Limits: The figures are the Ministry of Construction's own account, relayed by the Government's e-newspaper; no audit body has published them. The zero is read off the page, not printed as a number: the ministry lists 11 public-investment component projects, 10 of them from the 2021-2025 phase, against 3 BOT projects from 2017-2020. The full 2021-2025 phase was 12 component projects of about 729 km at VND 146,990 billion, all assigned to public investment by National Assembly Resolution 44/2022/QH15 (scanned PDF at datafiles.chinhphu.vn/cpp/files/vbpq/2022/01/44-qh.signed.pdf: 729 km in 12 component projects as public investment on page 1, Article 2.2; VND 146,990 billion on page 2, Article 2.5). The peak was itself a retreat from a plan. The Ministry of Transport listed eight sections for PPP in December 2017 (Decision 3535/QD-BGTVT, baochinhphu.vn, 26 December 2017), and only three reached contract, out of 11 component projects over 654 km. Most of the money in those three came from the state. The Government portal of 28 April 2024 puts Cam Lam-Vinh Hao at VND 8,925 billion with about 5,139 billion of state capital, and Dien Chau-Bai Vot at 11,157 billion with about 6,067 billion. The same page records the opening of Cam Lam-Vinh Hao and of Dien Chau-Bai Vot as far as National Highway 46B, with Nha Trang-Cam Lam already in service; the Ministry of Transport announced the full Dien Chau-Bai Vot opening for 30 June 2024 (baochinhphu.vn, 28 June 2024). Construction started in 2020-2021, per the Ministry of Transport on the 2024 page. The retreat is a choice as much as a market failure: the same 2025 page says the ministry's own study found BOT widening highly feasible, and it chose public investment, citing toll levels and the push to disburse public funds. This is one corridor. The record does not show whether PPP procurement fell on other expressways. The question is still open: a pre-feasibility report of June 2026 (baochinhphu.vn, 6 June 2026) proposes public investment for 15 component projects and PPP with state support only for the three existing BOT sections. That is a proposal, not a decision.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Vietnamsince 2010delivered and closedbears on Adult learning participation

Project 1956 vocational training for rural workers

Vietnam's General Department of Vocational Education reported that, by the end of 2019, about 9.6 million rural workers had received vocational training at various levels under the Prime Minister's Project 1956, 87.2% of its 11 million target, including 5.59 million whose elementary and under-three-month courses the project subsidised, 85.5% of a 6.54 million target for 2010 to 2020.

9,600,000 people, rural workers who received vocational training at various levels, end 2019. 5,590,000 people, rural workers supported for elementary or under-three-month training under project 1956 policy, end 2019. Vietnam General Department of Vocational Education (Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs), figures reported by the Government News portal (baochinhphu.vn), retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Vietnam's Prime Minister set a national ten-year quota for rural vocational training, and the labour ministry's vocational directorate financed short courses per head through provinces and districts, which commissioned public and private training providers against annual targets.

Preconditions

  • A provincial and district administration able to recruit learners and commission courses against a central quota
  • A network of district vocational centres and private providers to deliver short courses at volume
  • A per-trainee subsidy schedule set centrally, which made the quota financeable

Limits: The figures come from the directorate that administered the project, reported in the Government's own news outlet in January 2020, so 'by the end of 2019' was at best a preliminary tally and no final 2020 closing figure was opened. The count is cumulative over ten years and does not give the construct's share of adults trained in the last 12 months; it is likely to count enrolments rather than distinct people, and most of the subsidised training was courses under three months. The 9.6 million total includes training at all levels that the project did not fund, so the 5.59 million is the number attributable to the project's own policy. The project missed both targets. The article's employment outcome (more than 80.4% with new or better-paid work after training) is self-reported and includes people who kept the same occupation; no independent impact evaluation was opened. Provincial reports in the same years record uneven quality and courses that did not match local labour demand.

Adaptability

3 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Vietnamsince 2021still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

VNeID national electronic identity

Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security reported more than 70.2 million electronic-identification accounts issued by January 2024, with VNeID designed to replace paper documents and authenticate public and private services against the national population database.

70,200,000 accounts, electronic-identification accounts issued, 2024-01-16. Vietnam Ministry of Public Security, electronic-identification legal framework report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Vietnam made one population-data-backed identity the default credential for administrative services, then connected health, driving, social-security and financial attributes to it instead of asking each ministry to issue another account.

Preconditions

  • A population database with a stable identifier and identity-proofing process
  • Legal authority to make one credential valid across ministries and service providers
  • Interoperability and privacy controls for the sensitive records attached to the identity

Where else it has been used: A national identity app travels only when service owners actually retire their parallel logins. Vietnam's account count shows the rollout; adoption and safeguards remain separate tests.

Limits: Accounts issued are not the same as active use, successful service completion or public trust in a single identity provider. The number is reported by the ministry that runs the system and the article also records unresolved rules for organisation identities, authentication levels and how widely the service can be distributed.

Vietnamsince 1995still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Vietnam Social Security health-insurance expansion

Vietnam Social Security reported 95.523 million people enrolled in health insurance in 2024, covering 94.29% of the population and approaching the country's 95% universal-coverage target for 2025.

95,523,000 people, health-insurance participants, 2024. 94.29 % of population, population covered by health insurance, 2024. Vietnam Social Security, coverage progress report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Vietnam merged the administrative systems for social and health insurance, used compulsory and subsidised categories to widen the pool and kept a long-running public target visible as coverage moved from a minority programme toward universality.

Preconditions

  • A national social-security agency with local offices and a common beneficiary record
  • Public subsidies for people whose income makes contributions unaffordable
  • A provider and claims system capable of serving a rapidly expanding insured population

Where else it has been used: Coverage expansion is easier to copy than the administrative merger behind it. Vietnam's long series is useful because it shows the institutional work between a legal entitlement and near-universal enrolment.

Limits: Enrolment and coverage do not show whether people can obtain timely, affordable and high-quality care, or whether minority and remote communities receive the same service. The series is reported by the agency administering the scheme, and the population denominator and programme rules have changed over the three decades in the source.

Vietnamsince 2024still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Typhoon Yagi emergency restoration

After Typhoon Yagi struck northern Vietnam, the government reported on 16 September 2024 that power had returned to 92.5% of customers in affected localities and that 8,386 of 9,235 damaged mobile base stations had been restored.

92.5 % of customers, power customers restored in affected localities, 2024-09-16. 8,386 stations, damaged mobile base stations restored, 2024-09-16. Government News of Vietnam, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Yagi response report, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

Vietnam used central emergency direction, utility and telecom repair teams, and a shared damage report to restore lifeline networks while the storm response was still unfolding, keeping power and communications as parallel recovery priorities.

Preconditions

  • An emergency command chain able to direct utilities across provinces
  • Asset inventories and field reporting that identify damaged substations and base stations quickly
  • Repair crews, spare parts and access routes that can operate while floods and landslides continue

Where else it has been used: Recovery capacity is visible in the speed and completeness of restoration, not only in relief spending. Yagi provides a dated operational checkpoint while leaving long-term adaptation open.

Limits: This is an early restoration snapshot, not a final account of deaths avoided, housing and livelihood recovery, or resilience before the next storm. The ministry report covers affected northern localities and restoration status, while the figures do not independently verify the quality or durability of repaired power and communications assets.

Building

3 deliveries linked to Large project delivery.

Vietnamsince 2024still operatingbears on Large project delivery

National expressway build-out in 2024

Vietnam's Ministry of Transport reported that seven road projects were completed and opened in 2024, bringing the national expressway network to more than 2,021 kilometres.

2,021 kilometres, national expressway network in operation, 2024. 7 projects, road projects completed and opened in 2024, 2024. Vietnam Ministry of Transport, 2024 sector review published by Quang Ngai Government Portal, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry set a national completion pipeline, combined central investment with local site and land coordination, and reported completed links as an expanding network rather than isolated provincial projects.

Preconditions

  • A central project pipeline that can sequence links across provinces
  • Local authorities able to clear land and connect feeder roads
  • A stable road standard and funding mechanism that keeps partial links usable

Where else it has been used: Network delivery travels when each opening is useful on its own but designed for later connection. The Vietnamese total shows reach; it does not substitute for a cost-and-schedule dataset.

Limits: The network total and projects opened are an annual ministry progress account, not a project-by-project cost or schedule audit. Kilometres aggregate roads begun in different years and do not show construction quality, traffic demand, land-acquisition cost or the distribution of benefits between regions.

Vietnamsince 2010operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Cat Linhโ€“Ha Dong metro, a delayed and over-budget delivery

Vietnam's State Audit reported in 2019 that the Cat Linhโ€“Ha Dong metro's approved investment had risen from VND8,700 billion to VND18,000 billion and that a line originally due in November 2013 was still unfinished after repeated schedule changes.

18,000 billion Vietnamese dong, approved investment after revision, 2019. 8,700 billion Vietnamese dong, original approved investment, 2009. State Audit of Vietnam, findings reported by the Government News portal, retrieved 2026-08-31.

The move, and what it needed

The first urban-rail project was allowed to proceed with changing designs, slow site handover and a directly appointed foreign EPC contractor, while operating costs were omitted from the initial economic appraisal; late fixes converted a construction delay into a major cost revision.

Preconditions

  • An independent technical and cost review before design is split into buildable packages
  • Land and interface responsibilities settled before an EPC contract starts
  • A transparent appraisal that includes operations, maintenance and safety certification

Where else it has been used: Urban rail is a system contract, not just an elevated structure. Cat Linhโ€“Ha Dong is a negative case for copying a financing and contractor model without the institutions that can hold design, land and commissioning together.

Limits: The audit snapshot predates the line's eventual opening, so it records the delivery failure at the decision and construction stage rather than current ridership or service quality. The figures do not provide a full life-cycle cost, safety record or counterfactual transport benefit; the government news report is a summary of the State Audit findings rather than the complete audit file.

Vietnamsince 2024still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Quang Trach to Pho Noi 500kV circuit-3 transmission line

Vietnam built the 519-kilometre Quang Trach to Pho Noi 500kV circuit-3 transmission line across nine provinces after construction began on 18 January 2024, and the Government reported it in operation on 29 August 2024 'after six months of construction', meeting the Prime Minister's deadline of completion before September, at an investment of over VND22.3 trillion.

519 kilometres, length of the 500kv circuit-3 transmission line put into operation, 2024-08-29. 6 months, construction period as reported by the government, 2024-08-29. Viet Nam Government News (Government Office portal), inauguration report, retrieved 2026-10-01.

The move, and what it needed

Vietnam's Prime Minister made the line a dated national priority with his own progress reviews, Vietnam Electricity's transmission corporation split it into four component projects built in parallel, and the nine provinces on the route were held responsible for site clearance at the same time as construction.

Preconditions

  • A state-owned grid company able to mobilise contractors and equipment across four sections at once
  • Provincial governments that answer to the centre and can clear land on a central deadline
  • An acute supply crisis, the 2023 northern power cuts, that justified bypassing normal sequencing

Limits: The duration is the Government's own framing: 18 January to 27 to 29 August 2024 is over seven months of construction, not six, and design, investment approval and land clearance before January are not counted. The deadline it met was set during construction by the Prime Minister, so 'on schedule' measures against a political target, not an original baseline, and no approved budget was published to compare with the outturn: the Government's own articles give the investment as VND22 trillion on 14 August and over VND22.3 trillion on 29 August. A single line built under emergency priority after the 2023 northern power shortages shows what the state can do when it concentrates resources; it does not show routine project performance. Construction quality, safety, compensation paid to displaced households and the line's actual utilisation are not in the source, and the outlet is the Government's news portal, not an audit.